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Multiparty data hiding of quantum information
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We present protocols for multiparty data hiding of quantum information that implement
all possible threshold access structures. Closely related to secret sharing, data hiding has a
more demanding security requirement: that the data remain secure against unrestricted
LOCC attacks. In the limit of hiding a large amount of data, our protocols achieve an
asymptotic rate of one hidden qubit per local physical qubit. That is, each party holds a
share that is the same size as the hidden state to leading order, with accuracy and security
parameters incurring an overhead that is asymptotically negligible. The data hiding states
have very unusual entanglement properties, which we briefly discuss.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ta, 03.67.Hk
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a variety of situations, it is desirable to distribute data among many parties in such a way
that the parties can reconstruct the data only if they cooperate in a well-definedway. This problem
has been studied in several settings, including the purely classical case [24], encoding classical
data in quantum systems [10, 12, 13, 25], and encoding quantum data in quantum systems [8,
9, 16, 19]. For the last two settings, at least two inequivalent security criteria can be applied. In
quantum secret sharing [8, 16], certain authorized sets of parties are able to reconstruct the encoded
data if they cooperate to implement a joint operation, whereas the remaining, unauthorized, sets
are unable to get access regardless of what they do. In quantum data hiding [9, 10, 12, 13, 19, 25], the
requirement for cooperation is increased. The data must remain inaccessible if any combination
of the parties communicate classically, and can only be retrieved if the members of an authorized
set perform a joint quantum mechanical operation, perhaps supplemented by classical advice from
other parties outside the authorized set.
Consider the following fanciful scenario. After the debacle of the year 2000 election, authorities
in the state of Florida have decided to (do their best to) implement a tamper-proof vote counting
system for the upcoming 2004 election. One feature of the new system is that every counting
center must be attended by both a Democratic and a Republican observer. The system designers
enforce this by encoding the ballot box access code using a quantum data hiding scheme requir-
ing that the Democratic and Republican observers jointly implement a quantum operation to get
access to the code. The difficulty inherent in implementing a quantum operation remotely offers
some assurance that both observers will need to work together in the same place to extract the
code. The scheme also offers flexibility in incorporating smaller political parties unable to field a
full team of observers. The system could be designed, for example, such that the Greens would
hold a share of the encoded state but not need to be physically present; their participation via
classical communication would be sufficient.
Relatively few data hiding schemes have been presented in the literature. The first examples
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2are to be found in [25] and [10], which demonstrate that classical bits can be hidden in bipartite
Werner states. Generalizations to the multiparty setting realizing all sensible access structures are
given by [12, 13]. The earliest schemes for hiding quantum data [9] are based on hiding a classical
key that encrypts the quantum data. Much more efficient schemes for hiding quantum data di-
rectly were presented for two parties in [19]. Here we generalize the method of [19] to construct
(k, n) threshold hiding schemes, meaning that arbitrary classical communication in addition to
quantum communication among any k parties is authorized, that is, sufficient to retrieve the data,
but arbitrary classical communication along with quantum communication among groups of up
to k− 1 parties is unauthorized. Our contribution extends the multipartite threshold access struc-
ture results in [12, 13] to the domain of hiding quantum information, achieving an asymptotic
rate of one hidden (logical) qubit per local physical qubit. Like the schemes in [19], those pre-
sented here are significant improvements over the earlier multipartite results [9, 13] when a large
number of qubits or even bits are to be hidden – the accuracy and security requirements incur
additive (negligible) space overhead in our schemes and multiplicative (nonnegligible) overhead
in previous constructions. Also, unlike quantum secret sharing, where the no-cloning theorem
imposes the restriction that the complement of an authorized set be unauthorized, any threshold
value k between 1 and n is possible.
While presented in the language of cryptography, quantum data hiding is equally well a plat-
form for the study of nonlocality. Indeed, the original proposal of [25] was motivated by the dis-
covery of quantum nonlocality without entanglement, meaning sets of orthogonal product states
that could not be distinguished by local operations and classical communication (LOCC) alone [4].
Since the original discovery, considerable effort has been devoted to understanding the relation-
ship between local distinguishability and other types of nonlocality. (See [7, 11, 15, 21, 27] and
references therein.) This paper continues that effort, in the sense that we present whole subspaces
all of whose states are indistinguishable by LOCC but that can nonetheless be reconstructed by
some collective operations, which are now more carefully prescribed than in the earlier work.
Also, while much of that earlier work on local indistinguishability is devoted to determining
when a finite set of states cannot be perfectly distinguished by LOCC, our focus here is at the
other extreme, on near-perfect indistinguishability for entire subspaces. Moreover, in contrast to
the emphasis on product states in [4], the results of [20] ensure that the states we choose here are
by no means separable (they have near-maximal entanglement of formation) despite being LOCC
indistinguishable from the maximally mixed state.
Notation: We use the following conventions throughout the paper. log and exp are always taken
base 2. Unless otherwise stated, a state can be pure or mixed. The density operator |ϕ〉〈ϕ| of
the pure state |ϕ〉 will frequently be written simply as ϕ. U(d) denotes the unitary group on Cd,
B(Cd) the set of linear transformations from Cd to Cd and I the identity matrix. Physical operations
mapping d1-dimensional states to d2-dimensional states are completely positive trace-preserving
(CPTP) maps from B(Cd1) to B(Cd2). ‖ · ‖1 denotes the trace norm of a matrix and the 1-norm of
a vector while ‖ · ‖2 denotes the Hilbert space norm. Pr(E) is used to represent the probability of
event E.
3II. DEFINITIONS AND RESULTS
We begin with a formal definition of data hiding for quantum information:
Definition 1 A (δ, ǫ, s, dn)-qubit hiding scheme with (k, n) access structure consists of a CPTP en-
coding map, E : B(Cs) → B(Cdn) and a set of CPTP decoding maps D(X) : Cdn → B(Cs), one for each
set X of k parties, that can be implemented via quantum communication among the parties in X together
with classical communication among all parties. The encoding and decodings must satisfy
1. (Security) For all states ϕ0 and ϕ1 on C
s, along with all measurements L that can be implemented
using arbitrary quantum communication within groupings of k − 1 or fewer parties and arbitrary
classical communication between them,
‖L(E(ϕ0))− L(E(ϕ1))‖1 ≤ ǫ. (1)
2. (Correctness) For all X and for all states ϕ on Cs, ‖(D(X) ◦ E)(ϕ) − ϕ‖1 ≤ δ.
Notice that for k = 1 there are no unauthorizedmeasurements, so that a qubit hiding scheme with
(1, n) access structure is simply a method for implementing a kind of distributed data storage.
Any one of the n parties can recover the quantum data with the help of only classical “advice”
from the other n − 1 parties. We’ll see that even in this simple setting, our approach will be
considerably more efficient than the nai¨ve constructions based on local storage and teleportation
or the more sophisticated proposals in [6].
The encoding map we will use is of the form
E(ϕ) =
1
r
r∑
i=1
UiϕU
†
i , (2)
where the Ui are in U(d
n) and we fix some inclusion Cs ∼= S ⊂ Cdn for the encoded subspace;
this is the same type of map used for approximate randomization and bipartite data hiding in
[19]. Our strategy will be to show that if the Ui are selected independently and each according
to the Haar measure on U(dn), then for suitable choices of the parameters, E will provide a good
encoding with non-zero probability (over the random Ui). Given a set of parties in quantum
communication with each other, X, and its complement, W , our decoding map D(X) consists of
local measurements by the parties in W , communication of the measurement outcomes to the
parties in X, followed by a recovery procedure on X. More specifically, the decoding is achieved
in a two step process. In the first step, A(W ), each member of W performs a projection onto a
fixed local basis, collectively {|l〉W }dn−kl=1 , and sends the outcome to the members of X. Thus, if
W consists of the partiesW1,W2, . . . ,Wn−k, then A(W ) has the structure A(W ) = A(W1) ⊗ A(W2) ⊗
· · · ⊗A(Wn−k). An arbitrary hidden state |ϕ〉 ∈ S is thereby transformed to the stateA(W )(E(ϕ)) =∑
l(|l〉〈l|W ⊗ IX)E(ϕ)(|l〉〈l|W ⊗ IX), now entirely in the possession of the members of X since,
post-measurement, the system W can be assumed to contain only the measurement outcomes,
which get sent toX.
They will then perform the transpose channel T (X) [2, 23] of the CPTP map A(W ) ◦ E adapted
to the maximally mixed state on S. The transpose channel is a generic construction for approxi-
mately reversing a quantum operation, which in the present case leads to the following definition
for T (X). Let Pl := |l〉〈l|W ⊗ IX , PS be the projector onto S, and
N :=
s∑
i=1
dn−k∑
l=1
Pl
Ui√
r
PS
s
U †i√
r
Pl . (3)
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FIG. 1: The encoding and decoding maps. 1(a) depicts the encoding procedure. A random Ui is applied
to the state |ϕ〉 drawn from subspace S. The output, E(ϕ), is almost indistinguishable from the maximally
mixed state using arbitrary LOCC and quantum communication within groupings of k−1 and fewer parties.
1(b) depicts the decoding procedure. For any partition of the parties into an authorized setX of k parties and
its complement W of n− k parties, the unauthorized parties W1,W2, . . . ,Wn−k perform the measurements
A(Wj) in fixed local bases, sending the outcomes to the authorized parties, who then apply the tranpose
channel T (X). (Single lines represent quantum data, double lines classical data. Time flows from left to
right.)
Then,
T (X)(ψ) :=
∑
il
TilψT
†
il , where Til :=
PS√
s
U †i√
r
PlN
−1/2 . (4)
(N−1/2 is here defined to be zero outside the support ofN . The map T (X) is, therefore, defined on
the image of the subspace S by the map A(W ) ◦ E and can be extended to a CPTP map on all of
W ⊗X.) Formally, the decoding map is given by
D(X) = T (X) ◦A(W ) . (5)
The arrangement is illustrated in Figure 1. Our main result is
Theorem 1 Let d be sufficiently large that dk > 48/δ2, dn > 10(n + 2)/ǫ and, in the special case k = 1,
d
log d >
2840(2n+3)
δ2 . Then if
r =
⌈
32(n + 2)4
Cǫ2
· dk−1 log d
⌉
and
s =
⌊
Cǫ2δ2
1536(n + 2)4
· d
log d
⌋
, (6)
with probability at least 1/2, the encoding map (2) and decoding maps (5) give a (δ, ǫ, s, dn)-qubit hiding
scheme with (k, n) access structure.
The intuition leading to these choices for r and s is quite simple. First, security of the encod-
ing against groupings of k − 1 parties will require that our encoding randomize subsystems of
dimension dk−1 and smaller. This leads to a choice of r ≫ dk−1. On the other hand, successful
decodingwill require the k parties inX to be able to identify the unitaryUi that was applied to the
input state |ϕ〉 ∈ S without damaging the encoded state, which leads to the constraint rs ≪ dk.
Consequently, in light of the randomization requirement, s≪ d.
5III. PROOFS
To prove the theorem, we will make extensive use of some well-known facts about Gaussian
random variables and random quantum states. We use the notation g ∼ NC(0, 1) to denote that
g is a complex Gaussian random variable with mean 0 and variance 1. That is, g = g(x) + ig(y)
where g(x) and g(y) are independent, mean 0, variance 1/2 real Gaussian random variables.
Fact 1 (Lemma 23 of [5]) Let gi ∼ NC(0, 1) be independent complex Gaussian variables. Then, for ǫ ≥ 0
the probabilities of large deviations are given by
Pr
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
|gi|2 >< 1± ǫ
)
≤ exp
(
−N ±ǫ− ln(1± ǫ)
ln 2
)
. (7)
In particular, for −1 ≤ δ ≤ 1, we have δ − ln(1 + δ) ≥ δ26 , which implies that for 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1,
Pr
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
|gi|2 >< (1± ǫ)
)
≤ exp(−CNǫ2) , (8)
where C can be taken to be (6 ln 2)−1.
This can be used to derive:
Fact 2 (adapted from Lemma II.3 of [19]) Let ϕ be a pure state and P be a projector of rank p, both on a
Hilbert space of dimension d. If {Ui}Ni=1 are chosen independently and according to the Haar measure on
U(d), then there exists a constant C ≥ (6 ln 2)−1 such that
Pr
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Tr(Ui|ϕ〉〈ϕ|U †i P )−
p
d
>
< ±
ǫp
d
)
≤ exp
(
−Np ±ǫ− ln(1± ǫ)
ln 2
)
. (9)
If 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1, we get the simpler upper bound exp(−CNpǫ2) as in Fact 1.
We will also use:
Fact 3 (Lemma II.4 of [19]) For 0 < ǫ < 1 and dim H = d there exists a set N of pure states in H with
|N | ≤ (5/ǫ)2d such that for every pure state |ϕ〉 ∈ H there exists |ϕ˜〉 ∈ N with ‖ |ϕ〉〈ϕ| − |ϕ˜〉〈ϕ˜| ‖1≤ ǫ.
(We call such a set an ǫ-net.)
Theorem 1: Proof of security
Security is guaranteed if no unauthorized measurement can distinguish any encoded state
from the maximally mixed state. Wewould like to show that the probability (over random choices
of Ui) of the contrary is small. An unauthorized measurement is LOCC and thus separable [3, 4]
over a partition of the n parties into groups of size< k. Wewill actually prove security against this
larger class of measurements. It suffices to consider measurements with rank one POVM elements
since any measurement can be refined to such a measurement without decreasing distinguisha-
bility. For example, a measurement implemented by LOCC between three groups of parties W1,
W2 andW3 will have a POVM of the form {Zi = Z(1)i ⊗Z(2)i ⊗Z(3)i }, where each Z(j)i is an operator
on the spaceWj . Suppose that it is known that∣∣∣Tr[ZiE(ϕ)] − Tr[Zi]
dn
∣∣∣ ≤ ǫTr[Zi]
2dn
(10)
6for all states |ϕ〉 ∈ S. Then
∑
i
∣∣∣Tr[ZiE(ϕ)] − Tr[Zi I
dn
]
∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
2
, (11)
confirming the security condition, Eq. (1), for this particular POVM by the triangle inequality.
Thus, it is sufficient to bound
Pr
(
sup
|ϕ〉∈S
sup
Z
∣∣∣Tr[1
r
r∑
i=1
ZUiϕU
†
i ]−
1
dn
∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ
2dn
)
, (12)
where the second supremum is over all rank one projectors Z of the form Z = ⊗nq=1Znq , with∑n
q=1 nq = n, 0 ≤ nq < k corresponding to some partition of the n parties into groups of size nq
and each Znq a rank one projector on C
dnq . Now, if we let each Nnq be a ǫ2(n+2)dn -net for states on
C
dnq and NS an ǫ2(n+2)dn -net on S, then
∣∣∣Tr[1
r
r∑
i=1
(⊗nq=1Znq )UiϕU †i ]−
1
dn
∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ
2dn
=⇒
∣∣∣Tr[1
r
r∑
i=1
(⊗nq=1Z˜nq )Uiϕ˜U †i ]−
1
dn
∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ
2(n + 2)dn
(13)
for some Z˜nq ∈ Nnq , ϕ˜ ∈ Ns. By the union bound, the probability of Eq. (12) is therefore bounded
above by
max
{nq}
N{nq}max
ϕ˜,Z˜
Pr
(∣∣∣Tr[1
r
r∑
i=1
Z˜Uiϕ˜U
†
i ]−
1
dn
∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ
2(n + 2)dn
)
, (14)
where N{nq} =
n!∏
nq!
(
∏
q |Nnq |)|Ns| is the number of different ways n parties can be divided into
n groups of size nq, multiplied by the total number of net points that need to be verified. In
Eq. (14), the first maximization is taken over partitions {nq} of n such that 0 ≤ nq < k, while inner
maximization is taken over |ϕ˜〉 ∈ Ns and Z˜ ∈ ×qNnq . (This is a slight abuse of notation; note that
Z˜ is a rank one projector on the corresponding tensor product space.) Applying Facts 2 and 3, this
is bounded above by
2n logn
(10(n + 2)dn
ǫ
)2(n+1)dk−1
exp
( −Crǫ2
4(n + 2)2
)
, (15)
as long as s ≤ dk−1, which is the case for k > 1. If k = 1, all operations are authorized so there is
no need for a security requirement. If dn > 10(n+2)ǫ , this is less than
1
4 for r =
⌈
32(n+2)4
Cǫ2 d
k−1 log d
⌉
.
Theorem 1: Proof of correctness
Our goal is to show that for any X and for all |ϕ〉 ∈ S, ‖D(X) ◦ E(ϕ) − ϕ‖1 ≤ δ, again with
probability at least 3/4 over choices of {Ui}, so that the probability that the statement isn’t true is
no more than 1/4. This would be implied by 〈ϕ|(D(X) ◦ E)(ϕ)|ϕ〉 ≥ 1 − δ2/4 for all |ϕ〉 ∈ S [14],
which would in turn be implied by
∀i, l |〈ϕ|TilPlUi|ϕ〉|
2
‖PlUi|ϕ〉‖22
≥ 1− δ
2
4
:= 1− α. (16)
7So, it suffices to show that Eq. (16) holds with sufficiently high probability for any fixed |ϕ〉 ∈ S
that it can be achieved simultaneously for a net of states on S.
The proof idea is to take |ϕ〉 as a member of an orthonormal basis of S, {|j〉}sj=1. The success of
using T (X) to decode the states {PlUi|j〉}i,j,l can be gauged by considering it as the first piece of a
two-stage implementation of the Pretty Good Measurement (PGM) [18], the criterion for success
of which is well-understood [17]. More specifically, let |ξijl〉 = Pl Ui√r
|j〉√
s
, which is non-zero with
probability one. According to Eq. (3), N =
∑
ijl |ξijl〉〈ξijl|. For any state ρ,
〈j|Til ρT †il|j〉 = Tr[ρT †il|j〉〈j|Til] (17)
= Tr
[
ρN−1/2Pl
Ui√
r
|j〉〈j|
s
U †i√
r
PlN
−1/2
]
(18)
= Tr[ρN−1/2|ξijl〉〈ξijl|N−1/2] (19)
= Tr[ρMijl], (20)
where Mijl := N
−1/2|ξijl〉〈ξijl|N−1/2 is a POVM element of the PGM on the set of unnormalized
states {|ξijl〉〈ξijl|}. Letting ρ = PlUi|j〉〈j|U
†
i
Pl
〈j|U†i PlUi|j〉
, the LHS of Eqs. (16) and (17) coincide, while Eq. (20)
is the probability that the PGM will correctly identify PlUi|j〉‖PlUi|j〉‖2 . That is,
|〈j|TilPlUi|j〉|2
‖PlUi|ϕ〉‖22
=
Tr[|ξijl〉〈ξijl|Mijl]
‖|ξijl〉‖22
. (21)
We must therefore bound the probability of error for the PGM which, it is important to ob-
serve, is defined on a set of sub-normalized states, where the normalization of each state gives
its probability. An error bound for any equiprobable ensemble is given in [17], and we provide a
straightforward generalization to the present case of unequal a priori probabilities in Appendix
A. Applying this error bound, and using the orthogonality of the states |ξijl〉 for different values
of l, we obtain the following.
Lemma 1 For each i = 1, . . . , r, l = 1, . . . , dn−k, and j = 1, . . . , s,
1− |〈j|TilPlUi|j〉|
2
‖PlUi|j〉‖22
≤ ∆ijl := 1|〈j|U †i PlUi|j〉|2
∑
(i′,j′)6=(i,j)
|〈j′|U †i′PlUi|j〉|2. (22)
(Note that the sum ranges over values of i′ from 1 to r and j′ from 1 to s, not including the pair
(i, j).) The intuition behind this result is clear – our probability of misidentification for a fixed
state scales roughly like the sum of the overlaps of that state with all the states we could mistake
it for, divided by a normalization factor.
In order to evaluate Pr(∆ijl > α), and thus determine the probability (over random choices
of Ui) that the probability of misidentifying PlUi|j〉 (in the PGM) is small, we break up the above
sum into two terms:
∆ijl =
1
|〈j|U †i PlUi|j〉|2
∑
j′
∑
i′ 6=i
|〈j′|U †i′PlUi|j〉|2 +
1
|〈j|U †i PlUi|j〉|2
∑
j′ 6=j
|〈j′|U †i PlUi|j〉|2
=: ∆1ijl +∆
2
ijl. (23)
We can use Fact 2 to control the size of the denominator in ∆ijl with the result that
Pr
(
1
〈j|U †i PlUi|j〉
≥ 2dn−k
)
≤ exp
(
− d
k
24 ln 2
)
. (24)
8In general, if a particular eventE is excluded by a set of conditionsC1∧C2∧ · · · , then Pr(E) ≤
Pr(¬C1)+Pr(¬C2)+ · · · . (This holds for arbitrary dependence betweenE,C1, C2, . . .) We will use
this observation repeatedly in the arguments below.
Turning our attention to∆1ijl, we see that
∆1ijl =
1
|〈j|U †i PlUi|j〉|2
∑
j′
∑
i′ 6=i
|〈j′|U †i′PlUi|j〉|2
=
1
〈j|U †i PlUi|j〉
∑
j′
∑
i′ 6=i
Tr
[
|j′〉〈j′|U †i′
PlUi|j〉〈j|U †i Pl
〈j|U †i PlUi|j〉
Ui′
]
(25)
so, using Eq. (24) we find that Pr(∆1ijl > β) is bounded above by
Pr
(
2dn−k
∑
j′
∑
i′ 6=i
Tr[|j′〉〈j′|U †i′
PlUi|j〉〈j|U †i Pl
〈j|U †i PlUi|j〉
Ui′ ] > β
)
+ exp
(
− d
k
24 ln 2
)
. (26)
If we choose (r − 1)s ≤ βdk/3 and apply Fact 2, we see that this is no greater than
exp
(
− (r − 1)s
24 ln 2
)
+ exp
(
− d
k
24 ln 2
)
. (27)
We must also deal with ∆2ijl. For k = n, this is identically zero, whereas for 1 ≤ k < n we rely on
the following lemma, the proof of which can be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 2 If 0 < β, ǫ ≤ 1, s ≤ βd/128 and 1 ≤ k < n, then
Pr
(
1
|〈j|U †i PlUi|j〉|2
∑
j′ 6=j
|〈j′|U †i PlUi|j〉|2 > β
)
≤ 4s exp
(
− βd
k
128 ln 2
)
. (28)
The lemma applies if we choose s =
⌊
βCǫ2
96(n+2)4
d
log d
⌋
with d large enough that s > 1. Together,
Eqs. (27) and (28) imply (letting β = α4 ) that if we choose r and s such that αd
k/21 ≤ (r − 1)s ≤
αdk/12,
Pr
(
∆ijl >
α
2
)
≤ 4s exp
(
− αd
k
512 ln 2
)
+ exp
(
− (r − 1)s
24 ln 2
)
+ exp
(
− d
k
24 ln 2
)
≤ 6s exp
(
− αd
k
512 ln 2
)
. (29)
Eq. (29) tells us that for any |ϕ〉 ∈ S, in the limit of large d, it is overwhelmingly likely that Eq. (16)
is satisfied, and thusD(X) ◦ E(ϕ) is close to ϕ. However, we would like to bound the probability
of error for all states simultaneously. To do this, let η = α
12dn−k
and NS be an η-net for S with
|NS | ≤ ( 5η )2s. Then, for 1 ≤ k < nwe find
Pr
(
inf
|ϕ〉∈S
min
i,l
〈ϕ|TilPlUi|ϕ〉〈ϕ|U †i PlT †il|ϕ〉
〈ϕ|U †i PlUi|ϕ〉
≤ 1− α
)
≤ Pr
(
∃i, l, |ϕ˜〉 ∈ NS s.t. 〈ϕ˜|TilPlUi|ϕ˜〉〈ϕ˜|U †i PlT †il|ϕ˜〉 ≤ (1−
α
2
)〈ϕ˜|U †i PlUi|ϕ˜〉
)
+Pr
(
∃i, l, |ϕ˜〉 ∈ NS s.t. 1
2dn−k
> 〈ϕ˜|U †i PlUi|ϕ˜〉
)
≤ rdn−k
(5
η
)2s
Pr
(
∆ijl ≥ α
2
)
+ rdn−k
(5
η
)2s
Pr
( 1
2dn−k
> 〈ϕ˜|U †i PlUi|ϕ˜〉
)
. (30)
9Combining this with Eqs. (24) and (29), we finally find that
Pr
(
inf
|ϕ〉∈S
min
i,l
〈ϕ|TilPlUi|ϕ〉〈ϕ|U †i PlT †il|ϕ〉
〈ϕ|U †i PlUi|ϕ〉
≤ 1− α
)
≤ 6rsdn−k
(5
η
)2s
exp
(
− αd
k
512 ln 2
)
+ rdn−k
(5
η
)2s
exp
(
− d
k
24 ln 2
)
, (31)
so that if we require
(
n
k
)(
6rsdn−k
(5
η
)2s
exp
(
− αd
k
512 ln 2
)
+ rdn−k
(5
η
)2s
exp
(
− d
k
24 ln 2
))
≤ 1
4
(32)
we guarantee that the probability of any one of the D(X) failing is no more than 14 . The case of
k = n can be analyzed in the same way, with the exception that the second term in Eq. (30) is
identically zero, resulting in the requirement that
6rs
(5
η
)2s
exp
(
− αd
k
512 ln 2
)
≤ 1
4
. (33)
Both Eq. (32) and Eq. (33) are satisfied if we choose d sufficiently large that dk ≥ 48/δ2 and, for
k = 1, 2840(2n+3)
δ2
≤ dlog d , then choose both r and s according to
r =
⌈
32(n + 2)4
Cǫ2
· dk−1 log d
⌉
s =
⌊
Cǫ2δ2
1536(n + 2)4
· d
log d
⌋
. (34)
Combining this with our analysis of the probability that a random choice of encoding is secure,
we also get the second condition that dn > 10(n + 2)/ǫ. When these requirements are satisfied,
E(·) and the set of D(X)(·) provide a (δ, ǫ, s, dn) qubit hiding scheme with (k, n) access structure
with probability at least 1/2.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have shown how to construct multiparty hiding schemes with threshold access structures
for quantum information. A notable feature of these schemes is that in the limit of hiding a large
amount of data, the storage requirement approaches one local physical qubit per hidden qubit.
That is, the share that each party holds is to leading order the same size as the hidden state. The
accuracy and security parameters incur an overhead that is additive, and therefore negligible from
the point of view of the asymptotic rate.
It seems likely that the threshold schemes presented here can be concatenated to provide hid-
ing schemes with non-zero asymptotic hiding rate for arbitrary realizable access structures. (Re-
alizable here meaning consistent with monotonicity since a superset of an authorized set must
also be an authorized set [12, 13].) The question of security under concatenation relates to the
distillability of our encoding states; if a large amount of entanglement could be distilled from
the encoding states, access to some of the encoded data could be sacrificed to compromise the
security of the rest. Luckily, based on the results of [20], we suspect that the encoding states
have at most a small amount of distillable entanglement between sub-threshold sets of parties,
10
perhaps even a vanishing amount. Still, the connection between the theory of multipartite entan-
glement and multiparty data hiding is not well understood and deserves further investigation.
At the very least, the states used here have been engineered with very extreme properties: small
sub-threshold distinguishability, high symmetry, high entanglement of formation and likely low
distillable entanglement.
Beyond the question of security under concatenation, it would be worth knowing whether a
composable definition of data hiding could be formulated and whether the schemes presented
here would realize the definition. In a similar vein, we would like to know the extent to which
the schemes presented here are stable against small amounts of entanglement shared between the
parties; does security fail all at once or gracefully? Can schemes completely robust against finite
amounts of entanglement be designed? The strongest possible such result would be a demonstra-
tion that the schemes are secure whenever there is insufficient entanglement to teleport any local
shares.
Moreover, while imperfect security is inevitable in data hiding (at least in the absence of su-
perselection rules [22, 26]), perfect accuracy is possible, as demonstrated by [9] and [10]. Is perfect
accuracy possible while simultaneously achieving the rates found in this paper? Since the bulk of
the technical difficulty in the present paper comes from proving the existence of sufficiently good,
albeit imperfect decodings, a scheme with perfect decodings could conceivably be significantly
simpler.
Finally, while we have not provided an explicit construction of the encoding map, it is im-
portant to notice that the probability of 1/2 in Theorem 1 is arbitrary, and could be chosen ar-
bitrarily close to one at the expense of increasing (decreasing) the proportionality constant for
r (s) in Eq. (6). In this sense, secure and accurate hiding schemes of the form we present are
generic in the limit of large dimension. Nevertheless, it would be more satisfying to find explicit,
non-probabilistic choices for the encoding unitaries, implementable in polynomial time, and still
giving secure and accurate data hiding schemes, as was done for approximate encryption in [1].
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APPENDIX A: SUCCESS CRITERION FOR THE PGMWITH UNEQUAL STATE PROPABILITIES
Using the method of [17], we will bound the probability of error for the PGM when the states
occur with unequal probabilities. (The symbols used in this derivation are locally defined.) Let
{|ξi〉} be a set of subnormalized states so that ‖|ξi〉‖22 represents the probability of |ξi〉, and N =∑
i |ξi〉〈ξi|. The elements of the PGM areMi = N−1/2|ξi〉〈ξi|N−1/2. We define the matrix
Tij = 〈ξi|ξj〉 , (A1)
which has square root
(
√
T )ij = 〈ξi|N−1/2|ξj〉 . (A2)
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In terms of T , the probability of the PGM correctly identifying |ξi〉 is
p(i|i) = 〈ξi|Mi|ξi〉〈ξi|ξi〉 =
(√
T
)2
ii
〈ξi|ξi〉 . (A3)
Applying the inequality
√
x ≥ 32x− 12x2 to the matrix
√
x =
√
T√
〈ξi|ξi〉
(which we are able to do, since
the present choices of
√
x and x are Hermitian and nonnegative) and noting that the inequality
holds for the diagonal entries gives
(
√
T )ii√〈ξi|ξi〉 ≥
3
2
Tii
〈ξi|ξi〉 −
1
2
∑
j
|Tij|2
|〈ξi|ξi〉|2 = 1−
1
2
∑
j 6=i
|Tij|2
|〈ξi|ξi〉|2 = 1−
1
2
∑
j 6=i
|〈ξi|ξj〉|2
|〈ξi|ξi〉|2 . (A4)
Combining Eq. (A3) and Eq. (A4) yields the result
p(i|i) ≥ 1−
∑
j 6=i
|〈ξi|ξj〉|2
|〈ξi|ξi〉|2 , (A5)
which is equivalent to
p(¬i|i) ≤
∑
j 6=i
|〈ξi|ξj〉|2
|〈ξi|ξi〉|2 . (A6)
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Wewould like to show that if 0 < β, ǫ ≤ 1, s ≤ βd/128 and 1 ≤ k < n, then
Pr
(
1
|〈j|U †i PlUi|j〉|2
∑
j′ 6=j
|〈j′|U †i PlUi|j〉|2 > β
)
≤ 4s exp (− βdk
128 ln 2
)
. (B1)
Our argument is somewhat lengthy but completely elementary. Wewill make use of the fact that a
Haar-distributed state inCd
′
can be expressed as |γ〉‖|γ〉‖2 where |γ〉 is a d′-dimensional vectorwith all
coordinates drawn independently from NC(0, 1). (Throughout this section, any variable written
as gx, g
y
x or gabxy, for arbitrary values of x, y, a and b, will denote a random variable drawn from
NC(0, 1). They are all chosen independently.) To begin, we can express the marginal distributions
of the Ui|j′〉 in terms of complex Gaussians (ignoring correlations between the vectors Ui|j′1〉 and
Ui|j′2〉):
Ui|j′〉 = 1√∑dk
h=1
∑dn−k
m=1 |gij
′
hm|2
dk∑
h=1
dn−k∑
m=1
gij
′
hm|h〉X |m〉W . (B2)
It will also be useful to note that ǫ− ln(1 + ǫ) ≥ ǫ2 if ǫ ≥ 6, in which case Eq. (8) can be replaced by
Pr
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
|gi|2 ≥ (1 + ǫ)
)
≤ exp
(
−N ǫ
2 ln 2
)
. (B3)
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Using Eqs. (8) and (B3), the fact that dn−1 ≥ 128s and recalling that j′ = 1, . . . , s, we find
Pr
(∑j′−1
i=1 |gi|2∑dn
i=j′ |gi|2
>
1
4d
)
≤ Pr
( j′−1∑
i=1
|gi|2 > 1
4d
dn − j′
2
)
+ Pr
( dn∑
i=j′
|gi|2 < d
n − j′
2
)
≤ exp
(
− d
n−1
32 ln 2
)
+ exp
(
− d
n
32 ln 2
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− d
n−1
32 ln 2
)
, (B4)
which will be useful below. To complete our task, however, we will need to move beyond the
simplest Gaussian approximation to the distribution of the {Ui|j′〉} that takes into account the
correlations between the vectors for different values of j′. We can relate {Ui|j′〉} to a collection of
independent Haar-distributed vectors, |ψj′〉, as follows:
|ψj′〉 = 1√∑dn
t=1 |gj
′
t |2
(√√√√ dn∑
t=j′
|gj′t |2Ui|j′〉+
j′−1∑
t=1
gj
′
t Ui|t〉
)
(B5)
To see this, notice that Ui|j′〉 is distributed uniformly in the orthogonal complement to the span
of {Ui|t〉}j
′−1
t=1 , which means that it can be represented as Ui|j′〉 = (
∑dn
t=j′ |gj
′
t |2)−1/2
∑dn
t=j′ g
j′
t |bj
′
t 〉,
where {|bj′t 〉} forms an orthonormal basis of the complement space. Substituting this into the ex-
pression above shows that |ψj′〉 is simply a Gaussian state divided by its norm – aHaar distributed
state. Choosing the gj
′
t independently guarantees that the |ψj
′〉will be independent.
Now, without loss of generality, we’ll choose j = 1, so that our goal is to estimate
1
|〈1|U †i PlUi|1〉|2
s∑
j′=2
|〈1|U †i PlUi|j′〉|2. (B6)
Inverting Eq. (B5) gives
Ui|j′〉 =
√∑dn
t=1 |gj
′
t |2√∑dn
t=j′ |gj
′
t |2
|ψj′〉 − 1√∑dn
t=j′ |gj
′
t |2
j′−1∑
t=1
gj
′
t Ui|t〉 (B7)
so that
〈1|U †i PlUi|j′〉 =
√∑dn
t=1 |gj
′
t |2√∑dn
t=j′ |gj
′
t |2
〈1|U †i Pl|ψj
′〉 − 1√∑dn
t=j′ |gj
′
t |2
j′−1∑
t=1
gj
′
t 〈1|U †i PlUi|t〉. (B8)
Using the inequality |a+ b|2 ≤ 2(|a|2 + |b|2) then leads to
|〈1|U †i PlUi|j′〉|2 ≤ 2
(∑dn
t=1 |gj
′
t |2∑dn
t=j′ |gj
′
t |2
|〈1|U †i Pl|ψj
′〉|2 + 1∑dn
t=j′ |gj
′
t |2
∣∣∣ j
′−1∑
t=1
gj
′
t 〈1|U †i PlUi|t〉
∣∣∣2)
≤ 2
[(
1 +
∑j′−1
t=1 |gj
′
t |2∑dn
t=j′ |gj
′
t |2
)
|〈1|U †i Pl|ψj
′〉|2 +
∑j′−1
t=1 |gj
′
t |2∑dn
t=j′ |gj
′
t |2
j′−1∑
t=1
|〈1|U †i PlUi|t〉|2
]
. (B9)
Summing over values of j′ in Eq. (B9) and using Eq. (B4) shows that
Pr
(
s∑
j′=2
|〈1|U †i PlUi|j′〉|2 > 2
( s∑
j′=2
(1 +
1
4d
)|〈1|U †i Pl|ψj
′〉|2 +
s∑
j′=2
1
4d
s∑
t=1
|〈1|U †i PlUi|t〉|2
))
(B10)
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is less than or equal to 2s exp
(
− dn−132 ln 2
)
, which implies in turn that
Pr
(
s∑
j′=2
|〈1|U †i PlUi|j′〉|2 > 4
s∑
j′=2
|〈1|U †i Pl|ψj
′〉|2 + s
2d
s∑
t=2
|〈1|U †i PlUi|t〉|2 +
s
2d
|〈1|U †i PlUi|1〉|2
)
(B11)
is bounded above by the same 2s exp
(
− dn−132 ln 2
)
. Moving the second sum on the RHS to the LHS
and noting sd ≤ 1 shows that
Pr
(
1
|〈1|U †i PlUi|1〉|2
s∑
j′=2
|〈1|U †i PlUi|j′〉|2 >
8
|〈1|U †i PlUi|1〉|2
s∑
j′=2
|〈1|U †i Pl|ψj
′〉|2 + s
d
)
(B12)
is again bounded above by 2s exp
(
− dn−132 ln 2
)
. Finally, we can upper bound
Pr
(
1
|〈1|U †i PlUi|1〉|2
s∑
j′=2
|〈1|U †i Pl|ψj
′〉|2 > β
16
)
(B13)
by using Fact 2, Eq. (24) and the estimate leading to Eq. (B3), along with the observation that
|ψ1〉 = Ui|1〉, with the result that the probability in Eq. (B13) is less than or equal to
exp
(
− βd
k
128 ln 2
)
+ exp
(
− d
k
24 ln 2
)
. (B14)
Combining this with the bound on Eq. (B12) and noting sd ≤ β2 gives the result
Pr
(
1
|〈1|U †i PlUi|1〉|2
s∑
j′=2
|〈1|U †i PlUi|j′〉|2 > β
)
≤ exp
(
− βd
k
128 ln 2
)
+ exp
(
− d
k
24 ln 2
)
+ 2s exp
(
− d
n−1
32 ln 2
)
≤ 4s exp
(
− βd
k
128 ln 2
)
. (B15)
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